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Abstract: This article explores the specific question of protection which tort law in 
England and Wales affords to individuals who are victims of ethical spiking (con-
sumption of food contaminated by malicious third parties which is physically harm-
less, but repugnant to their religion or beliefs), and moves on to analyse the wider 
implications for the possible evolution of trespass to the person, and the relationship 
between tort and human rights law in the UK. Although not a comparative piece, it 
draws on some features of the Spanish paradigm which illustrate significant benefits of 
developing the law in the English context in the manner suggested. 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
What private legal redress is available in England and Wales for individuals who 
discover that a third party has deliberately contaminated their food with a sub-stance 
which is physically harmless but repugnant to their beliefs? The answer to this question 
is by no means straightforward, but the conundrum goes to the heart of the values 
embedded within the legal framework: in essence, what are the fun-damental interests 
which tort law seeks to protect? As Baez demonstrates, these interests are not static, 
given that all living legal systems are constantly evolving, but are nevertheless a key 
element of any sophisticated assessment.1 The interests identified as being infringed, 
and the weight which the juridical system attaches to them, are crucial determiners of 
the remedies available to individual litigants. This article not only explores a specific 
question which has not hitherto been ad- 
 
 
 
1 B Baez, Tort Law in the USA (2010) 34.  
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dressed, it also confronts the much wider implications of the problem for tort and 
human rights law.  
There have been a number of high profile cases of ethically contaminated food in 
Britain, and we shall, therefore, explore the problem in this context. How-ever, a 
contrasting approach from another jurisdiction will illuminate more clearly some of the 
more striking features of the English and Welsh paradigm and, for this reason, we will 
consider certain aspects of the Spanish context as a useful counterpoint. We should 
stress at the outset that the reflections offered on the Iberian setting are given primarily 
to draw out features of the English and Welsh system, and the purpose of the piece is 
not to provide an in depth analysis of the position in Spain nor a comprehensive 
comparative discussion.  
In early 2018 a story broke in the UK via social and mainstream media con-cerning 
Laura Goodman, a chef who ‘spiked’ the meal of a vegan customer whom she found 
‘pious and judgemental’.2 There is some dispute as to what actually took place, but 
despite her subsequent denials, the comment was interpreted to mean that she had 
covertly introduced animal products into the diner’s meal.3 A considerable backlash 
ensued, organised vegan groups coordinated picketing as well as boycott campaigns in 
relation to the restaurant involved, and the beleaguered Goodman received death threats 
from outraged strangers.4  
The anger and fear engendered by the incident is beyond doubt, but it is well 
trodden ground in England5 that injured feelings and mental anguish do not, in and of 
themselves, generally give rise to a cause of action.6 They may often be relevant to the 
global assessment of damages, but without some additional identifiable interest at play 
from tort, contract or elsewhere, they will be insufficient to found a claim.7 
Consequently, in the absence of any harm in the form of personal  
 
 
2 ‘Head chef resigns over spiking vegan meal comments’ The Guardian 3 January 2018 <https://w 
ww.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/jan/03/head-chef-gets-death-threats-over-spiking-ve gan-food-
claim>. 
 
3 ‘Shropshire Chef offers resignation over “spiked vegan” post’ BBC News 3 January 2018 http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-shropshire-42552755.  
4 ‘Chef offers to resign after death threats over “spiked a vegan’s food” claims’ The Telegraph 3 January 
2018 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/03/chef-offers-resign-death-threats-spiked-vegan-
food-claims/ >. 
 
5 It should be noted that not all Common Law jurisdictions have held this line. See eg Saadati v 
Moorhead [2017] 1 Supreme Court Reports (SCR) 543, in which the Supreme Court of Canada 
allowed psychological injuries to be recognised in the absence of medical evidence.  
6 Page v Smith[1996] Appeal Cases (AC) 155; Amlin Corporate Member Ltd v Baby Basics 
Ltd [2017] England and Wales High Court (EWHC) 2047.  
7 Farley v Skinner [2001] United Kingdom House of Lords (UKHL) 49; Shaw v Leigh Day [2017] 
EWHC 825 Queen’s Bench (QB). 
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injury or property damage, it at first sight appears difficult to see how the victim of such 
a spiking incident could claim against the perpetrator, especially since whenever 
challenged, the UK judiciary have been resolute in holding the line against litigation 
based on emotional distress.8  
Furthermore, there are some cogent reasons to support this policy, as Shel-bourn9 
and Hewson10 have both argued. The subjective nature of bruised sensibilities would 
make constructing appropriate and consistent parameters around such claims an almost 
insurmountable obstacle. Indeed, as we shall discuss be-low, uncertainty for both 
claimants and defendants is an issue dogging the Spanish system in relation to this type 
of damage, since it has for many years adopted a more receptive stance towards 
emotional injury, or at least ‘moral damages’, which as a concept is broad enough to 
include distress falling short of psychiatric injury.11 For example, the non-physical 
element of bullying within a school setting has been found to appropriately fall within 
moral damage.12 
However, we would suggest that debates around compensation for injured feelings 
in England and Wales are actually a distraction from our current enquiry. Critical 
though such issues are, the primary interests at stake in cases of ethical contamination 
of food should not be categorised as emotional well-being. Of course, there will 
ordinarily be negative emotional consequences from the behaviour complained of, but 
this is usually the case with civil wrongs. For instance, if a claimant is injured due to 
the defendant’s incompetent driving,13 or is faced with insinuations of paedophilia all 
over Twitter,14 it is highly likely that this will cause distress, but the fundamental 
interests with which the legal system is concerned 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 per Lord Scott, para 62; Wong v Parkside Health 
NHS Trust [2001] England and Wales Court of Appeal (EWCA) 1721.  
9 C Shelbourn, Comforted but not compensated? Mourners and funeral picketing in English Law 
(2015) Ecclesiastical Law Journal (ELJ) 283, 288.  
10 B Hewson, Privacy claims hit the rocks (2003) 153 New Law Journal (NLJ) 1694f.  
11 B Espinosa/S Crespo, Los daños morales y su valoración en la responsabilidad médica (1997) 7 
Actualidad Civil 143, 158.  
12 Audiencia Provincial de Álava (Sección 1ª) Sentencia num. 120/2005 de 27 mayo. For cases of 
damages for emotional distress not necessarily associated with bodily injury of psychiatric harm in very 
different contexts, see: Audiencia Provincial de Asturias (Sección 7ª) Sentencia num. 1/2017 de 
12 enero (the adverse mental effects of living in damp housing, experienced independently of phy-sical impact); or 
Audiencia Provincial de Jaén (Sección 1ª) Sentencia num. 102/2015 de 9 marzo and Tribunal Supremo 
(Sala de lo Civil) Sentencia de 26 noviembre 1985 (emotional maltreatment be-tween spouses). 
 
13 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691.  
14 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB).  
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in these cases are physical integrity and protection from unjust reputational da-mage 
respectively.  
Likewise, we would suggest that here there are two underlying interests at stake in 
claims about ethical contamination of food:1) religious and ideological freedom; and 
2) bodily autonomy.  
Our keystone question is whether the law of tort in England and Wales effec-tively 
defends these twin interests in this very specific context. This enquiry is particularly 
important since, as we shall explore, both of them are indisputably recognised by the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Strasburg case law.  
We leave aside questions of contract, as in many instances there will be no 
contractual relationship between the victim and the perpetrator, and in any case, the 
protection of fundamental rights should not be contingent upon private agree-ments.15 
In the restaurant scenario, it could be that another diner in the party had paid for the 
meal, and equally, a person eating in public might fall prey to the malice of a stranger. 
Furthermore, unfortunately, both Anti-Semitic and Islamo-phobic incidents are rising 
in the UK,16 with the use of porcine products a common tactic to cause offence and, 
disturbingly, one which some far-right groups are even willing to defend.17 As a result, 
it does not require a great leap of imagination to envisage someone in religiously 
distinctive dress being targeted, and although our study will focus on veganism, given 
that this was the context in which the issue presented, it should be borne in mind that 
the discussion has implications for other groups, some of whom are particularly 
vulnerable at present. 
 
We shall begin by considering what possible avenues for redress a victim of such 
an incident might have at present in tort, and if these are not wholly satisfactory, 
whether and how the legal system might bridge any gap. In respect of the first exercise, 
we shall carry out an analysis of Bhamra v Dubb, 18 21st century litigation raising 
distinct but related issues, as it concerned personal injury 
 
 
 
15 There is an interesting discussion to be had about how the Goodman case might have played out in 
terms of an action for breach of contract, particularly in relation to assessment of damages, but that is 
outside the scope of our current investigation.  
16 UK Government Official Statistics, Hate Crime England and Wales 2016-2017, 17 October 2017 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2016-to-2017>; ‘Hate 
crime surged in England and Wales after terrorist attacks’ The Guardian 17 October 2017 <https:// 
www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/17/hate-soars-in-england-and-wales>.  
17 ‘Violent far-right protesters over “outrageous” sentence handed to man who left bacon sand-wich 
outside mosque’, Evening Standard 4 March 2017 <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/vi olent-
farright-protests-over-outrageous-sentence-handed-to-man-who-left-bacon-sandwich-out side-
a3481771.html>. 
 
18 Bhamra v Dubb (t/a Lucky Caterers) [2010] EWCA Civ 13. 
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caused by violation of a religious diet. We shall then discuss to what extent the torts of 
negligence and Wilkinson v Downton19 may respectively assist individuals who have 
unwittingly consumed food which is incompatible with their beliefs. We will next move 
on to look at academic commentary formulated in light of the horse-meat contamination 
scandal, as well as a range of causes of action which were suggested in response, whilst 
highlighting the potential problems of each. At that stage we shall propose trespass to 
the person as a possible alternative and, for obvious reasons, we will focus our attention 
on the two apparent complicating factors with this approach: indirect application of 
force and the question of intention. 
 
Then moving on to the second limb of our analysis, we will look further at the 
relevance of human rights law in this context, beginning with Convention rights, in 
particular those enshrined in arts 8 and 9, before looking at Common Law rights in this 
setting. We will also assess what impact this human rights backdrop might have on the 
possibility of applying trespass to the person in these situations. We shall also consider 
the related, but distinct question, of what the suit-ability of trespass says about the 
values embedded in the English and Welsh sys-tem. It is here that the comparison with 
Spain will be especially instructive in drawing out the way in which interests are 
recognised and prioritised by the juridical system. 
 
 
 
II Avenues in tort 
 
A reasonable starting point in assessing how a court might deal with this kind of spiking 
incident is an assessment of the way in which English law has previously responded to 
situations with a similar factual paradigm. What does existing case law have to tell us 
about ethical contaminants in food? 
 
 
A Bhamra v Dubb (t/a Lucky Caterers) – Personal injury and 
the violation of religious and ethical diets 
 
It must be acknowledged at the outset that Bhamra v Dubb differs, to an extent, from 
an incident of deliberate spiking, as the case did not involve any intention to cause 
distress (or perhaps even to violate dietary requirements) and, as we shall discuss, 
intention on the part of the perpetrator is an important consideration. 
 
 
 
19 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] EWHC 1 (QB). 
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However, it is an instructive 21st century British case involving food contaminated 
with animal products, contrary to religious principles. A guest attending a Sikh wedding 
had a known allergy to eggs, but because some branches of Sikhism forbid the 
consumption of eggs, he assumed that he could safely eat all of the food provided at 
the celebration.20 Regrettably, Lucky Caterers served a dish of ras malai which had in 
fact been made with egg. The claimant suffered anaphylactic shock and died. 
 
Both the judge at first instance and the Court of Appeal held the defendant liable 
in negligence. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no general requirement 
incumbent upon professional caterers to warn customers that food products might 
contain egg, even though it was obviously not disputed that a certain percentage of the 
population are known to suffer from egg allergies. Nevertheless, the defendant was 
under a duty to take reasonable care to refrain from serving egg in order to avoid 
offending against Sikh principles. Precisely for this reason, wedding guests were 
entitled to expect the food provided to be free from eggs, and the defendant was liable 
for any harm which ensued from acting on the basis of that expectation. 
 
 
 
B Tort of negligence 
 
Commentators applauded the conclusion reached by the court, although had a mixed 
response to its underlying reasoning. As O’Sullivan21 observed, the factual paradigm 
in many respects mirrored Donoghue v Stevenson,22 the wellspring from which the 
modern tort of negligence flows. In both cases, the claimant suffered in-jury from a 
food product bought by a third party, and therefore could not seek a contractual remedy. 
A key distinction, however, was that Mrs Donoghue asserted that she had drunk ginger 
beer laced with rotting snail, which would reasonably foresee-ably do harm to 
anybody’s digestion,23 whilst in contrast, the claimant in Bhamra v Dubb had eaten a 
wholesome food which most people consume without ill effects.  
O’Sullivan criticised the Court of Appeal for asserting that the defendant had a 
duty of care to avoid offending against religious principles, and stressed that this kind 
of duty is simply not recognised in negligence.24 The key point for this 
 
 
 
20 A Singh Mandair, Sikhism A Guide for The Perplexed (2013)171–175.  
21 JO’Sullivan, From Egg to Snail: Duty of Care, Fault and Food Allergies (2010) Cambridge Law 
Journal (CLJ) 435.  
22 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100.  
23 J Conn, Gingerlore: The Legends of Donoghue v Stevenson (2013) 3 Juridical Review 265–285.  
24 See Sullivan (fn 21) 435, 437. 
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commentator was that the defendant had led wedding guests to believe that the food 
would be egg-free, and it was reasonably foreseeable that individuals with allergies 
would relax their usual vigilance. There was effectively a representation that the food 
would not contain certain ingredients, when in fact it did so, with tragic consequences. 
This was not a case of accidental contamination in a kitchen, but agreeing to provide 
food which conformed to certain characteristics, and failing to do this. 
 
In contrast to O’Sullivan, Keren-Paz25 regarded the existence of a duty of care to 
avoid offending religious beliefs as a sound proposition, but did not deem it to be central 
to the case at hand. In his view, the issue was that even though the defendant understood 
that the menu choices were motivated by religious, rather than health considerations, 
this knowledge did not negate the fact that physical harm was a foreseeable 
consequence of failing to comply with the agreed con-straints.26 
 
Sometimes individuals have mixed motivations for adopting a particular diet or 
lifestyle, and Keren-Paz gave the example of a vegetarian observant Jew having two 
different reasons to avoid McDonalds chips cooked in beef fat;27 in the real world, 
people rely on information to fulfil more than one purpose. Ultimately, in his analysis 
‘the avoidance of allergy risk is an inevitable by-product of adhering to religious dietary 
restrictions, and therefore, a physical injury falls within the scope of risk which made 
the serving of eggs a breach of duty’.28 
When the arguments are distilled down, the essential point for present purposes 
remains the same. If religious or ethical standards are assured, and thus generate a 
reasonable expectation that food will be free from ingredients, then its supplier will be 
liable if the forbidden ingredients are present, and in fact cause harm. This is in harmony 
with the basic principles of negligence and is undoubtedly correct. If X informs Y that 
a situation is safe, when it is in fact dangerous, and Y suffers harm from reasonably 
relying on X, he will have an action in tort for the damage caused.29 If a claimant was 
induced to eat cheese made from cow’s milk by a false assurance that it was vegan, and 
suffered a reaction caused by a lactose allergy, then Bhamra v Dubb makes it clear 
that a claim for personal injury could be brought. Furthermore, if the knowledge that 
they had consumed dairy 
 
 
 
 
25 T Keren-Paz, Liability for Consequences, Duty of Care and the Limited Relevance of Specific 
Reliance: New Insights on Bhamra v Dubb (2016) Professional Negligence 50.  
26 Keren-Paz (2016) Professional Negligence 64.  
27 Keren-Paz (2016) Professional Negligence 65.  
28 Keren-Paz (2016) Professional Negligence 66.  
29 P Charlish, The Astrid Andersen Case (2004) 4 International Sports Law Review 85. 
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damaged the diner’s mental health, there would be the theoretical possibility of a claim 
for this hurt.  
It is has long been uncontroversial that psychiatric harm is a recognised cate-gory 
of personal injury, provided that it is a type which a doctor can objectively assess and 
verify (the claimant must establish a recognised mental illness, as emotional distress 
alone will always be inadequate).30 Nevertheless, as the work of commentators like 
Teff shows, the courts are vigilant in monitoring any potential widening of the ambit 
of such litigation.31 A restrictive approach towards duty of care, as well as other 
elements of the tort, has been maintained in this context.  
Consequently, an action for negligence would in principle be possible if a vegan 
was tricked into consuming an animal product and suffered clinical psychiatric harm 
as a result. However, in practical terms, the obstacles would be formidable: it would 
not be easy to establish a relevant duty of care, to demonstrate that the risk of harm was 
foreseeable, or to show that there was causation be-tween spiking of the food and the 
mental illness which the claimant experienced. As Jones32 argues, establishing 
causation with psychiatric injury can be an uphill struggle, and Kennedy33 is correct to 
observe that differing scientific and clinical opinions compound the challenges faced 
by the courts in adjudicating on such matters. 
 
 
 
C Wilkinson v Downton 
 
Given that negligence would not be an easy claim, are there any alternative routes? 
There is a long history of cases involving nervous shock from ill-judged practical jokes, 
even where these have no physical element. In Wilkinson v Down-ton the defendant 
told Mrs Wilkinson that her husband had had a horrible accident and suffered two 
broken legs. Apparently, he thought that this would be funny. Mrs Wilkinson 
experienced a dramatic and severe reaction which incapacitated her and required 
medical treatment. An action on the case34 was success- 
 
 
 
 
30 See eg Page v Smith [1995] UKHL 7.  
31 H Teff, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Harm: Justifications and Boundaries (1998) 
57 CLJ 91, 121.  
32 M Jones, Causation and Psychiatric Damage (2008) 24 Professional Negligence 255, 257.  
33 H Kennedy, Limits of Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Courts and Tribunals: Science and Sensibil-
ity (2004) 10 (1) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 16, 19.  
34 The branch of tort which played a crucial part in the evolution of the modern law of negligence. 
See further J Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (2002) 406–420. 
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fully brought, and Wilkinson v Downton claims have survived into the modern law of 
tort.35  
However, it should be noted that the remit of such actions is very carefully guarded. 
In Rhodes v OPO,36 the majority of the Supreme Court found that there must be no 
legitimate reason for the words or conduct of the defendant and there must be an 
intention to cause severe distress. Crucially, mere recklessness about the consequences 
would not suffice. Furthermore, the harm inflicted must be diagnosable psychiatric 
injury, and Wilkinson v Downton is emphatically not a vehicle for obtaining 
compensation for hurt feelings. Nevertheless, in an instance where one party caused a 
vegan to consume animal products, and then took malicious delight on seeing the 
anticipated and intended horrified reaction of the victim upon learning what had 
happened, it is possible to conceive of a claim being brought if the reaction was so 
severe as to have an impact on the mental health of the victim. 
 
In Rhodes, the Supreme Court was asked to adjudicate on the publication of an 
autobiographical book which might cause distress to a close relative of its author, and 
an injunction was being sought. Attempting to use the tort pre-emptively, as a means of 
preventing conduct, was in itself a new departure, and this novel context had profound 
implications for freedom of expression. In fairness, such weighty hu-man rights 
considerations would not apply in the context of a cruel prank being played on an 
individual vegan, as limiting an author’s freedom to publish his or her life story is a 
very different proposition from allowing a claim against someone who privately fed 
meat to a vegan for the satisfaction of witnessing their distress. More-over, it is 
important to stress that Rhodes did not signal the death-knell for Wilkinson v 
Downton, but merely a refusal to expand it in a particular direction.  
The biggest disadvantage to a Wilkinson v Downton claim is that shared with the 
tort of negligence, which is unsurprising since, as Réaume observes, the two torts are 
so closely intertwined that some commentators have regarded Wilkinson as sim-ply 
being part of the development of the modern tort of negligence37 (but this is a debate 
which need not detain us here). The key point is that to bring either action a claimant 
must show objectively demonstrable personal injury for the purposes of English and 
Welsh law. The legal system recognises a right to personal safety,38 but safety does not 
equate to freedom from distress: what if the victim has not been injured in body or 
mind? A physically and mentally hale vegan who had been on the receiving end of a 
spiking incident could not bring either claim. 
 
 
 
35 Wainwright and Another v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53.  
36 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32.  
37 D Réaume, The Role of Intention in the Tort in Wilkinson v Downton, in: J Neyers et al (eds), 
Emerging Issues in Tort (2007) 533.  
38 OPO v Rhodes [2015] UKSC 32, per Baroness Hale 245. 
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Furthermore, the underlying rationale behind this line in the sand provides a 
powerful reason not to attempt to expand Wilkinson v Downton any further in this 
direction. At present a claimant must show objectively verifiable harm, and either an 
intention to cause such harm, or recklessness as to whether or not it ensued.39 (It is 
probable that the thorny issue of intention will be revisited in future cases in this area, 
as its scope remains doubtful in relation to recklessness at least). So what alternative 
avenues are at the disposal of individuals who unwittingly through deception consume 
food which offends their principles, but does not inflict assessable damage? 
 
 
 
D Solutions proposed by Weaver 
 
In a short, but thorough and thought-provoking article, Weaver40 put forward a number 
of possible paths open to individuals who unknowingly consumed horse-meat or pork 
in the food contamination scandals involving Ikea and other busi-nesses.41 He quite 
rightly concluded that none of the routes offered a perfect solution in all instances, but 
it would be useful to reprise and assess his findings. 
 
 
1 Deceit 
 
Establishing the basic building blocks of this tort would be unachievable for most 
potential claimants. They would need to show that they had been induced by ‘fraudulent 
representations’ to consume the meat, and also that they had suffered a ‘detriment’.42 
Again, the law would not recognise feelings of horror, grief, guilt and revulsion as a 
detriment, real and unpleasant though they might be. The tort of deceit is concerned 
with the economic consequences of reliance upon duplicitous assertions.43 In fact, in 
Wilkinson v Downton, Wright J ruled out any possible action based on deceit, which 
illustrates the point very well.44 
 
 
39 Y Lieu, The Rule in Wilkinson v Downton: Conduct, Intention and Justifiability (2015) 78 (2) 
Mod-ern Law Review (MLR) 49, 351.  
40 M Weaver, The Mane Lane (2013) NLJ 163, 223.  
41 ‘Ikea withdraws all meatballs from UK stores’ The Guardian (25/2/2013) <https://www.theguar 
dian.com/uk/2013/feb/25/horsemeat-scandal-ikea-meatballs-uk>.  
42 Derry v Peek [1889] UKHL 1.  
43 Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd  [1996] UKHL 3 
[1997] AC 254 (21 November 1996); Clef Aquitaine SARL v Laporte Materials (Barrow) Ltd [2000] 2 
All England Law Reports (All ER) 493.  
44 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] EWHC 1 (QB). 
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2 Contract 
 
Weaver cited Bhamra v Dubb and correctly pointed out that Donoghue v Stevenson 
was followed in that instance. The rules of privity mean that contract cannot pro-vide a 
satisfactory remedy on these facts. We would agree with this conclusion, given that 
allowing a contractual claim here would drive a coach and horses through the Contract 
Rights of Third Parties Act. The statute makes crystal clear that a third party can only 
enforce a contract where there is express provision allowing for this or an intention to 
confer a benefit on that third party.45 The doc-trine of privity has been drastically 
modified, but not abolished, and the courts cannot simply dismantle it because this 
appears convenient in a given context. 
 
 
3 Negligence 
 
Weaver acknowledged the point that emotional distress on its own is not sufficient to 
found a claim. As stated above, the issue is unassailable in UK law, as it currently 
stands.46 A secondary potential avenue would be a negligent failure to warn, which 
Weaver tentatively suggested could be developed from the duty in a medical context 
for doctors to warn patients fully of the risks of procedures, or face claims in negligence 
if there is an adverse outcome.47 Again, the weaknesses highlighted by Weaver himself 
are deeply problematic. Firstly, there is the question of the special relationship between 
doctors and patients which generates a duty of care to give information, and would not 
ordinarily apply in other contexts. For example, airlines are not obliged to explicitly 
inform potential passengers of all known risks of air travel when buying a ticket. 
Secondly, there is the perennial issue that negligence requires demonstrable legal harm 
for a claim to be successful. 
 
 
 
4 Conventional awards 
 
Weaver discusses the so called ‘wrongful birth’ cases48 in which women have con-
ceived as a result of medical negligence (usually failed sterilisation), and given  
 
 
45 Contract Rights of Third Parties Act 1999, secs 1 and 2.  
46 See eg White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1998] 3 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 1509.  
47 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41.  
48 See McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [1999] 4 All ER 961 and Rees v Darlington 
Memorial Hos-pital NHS Trust [2003] 1 AC 309. 
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birth to healthy children. The House of Lords in McFarlane rejected the idea that a 
healthy baby should be seen as damage rather than a blessing, although pain and 
suffering during pregnancy and birth could properly be construed as injury. 
Nevertheless, the courts have developed the concept of ‘conventional awards’ to 
recompense the mother where appropriate for her loss of autonomy in determining her 
family size (as opposed to the ‘damage’ of a baby and the cost of the child’s upbringing). 
Weaver put forward the creative side of similar awards being given in this context to 
recognise the deprivation of autonomy, but again, conventional awards have never been 
‘free-floating’ independent of an orthodox cause of action in tort.  
So does this leave the private law larder bare? Arguably not; there is some-thing 
on the shelf which could provide sustenance for a healthy claim. There is a tort not 
explored by Weaver, and its application here would be innovative, but by no means 
counterintuitive. There is, indeed, trespass. 
 
 
E Trespass to the person 
 
As we have seen, the fundamental stumbling block in utilising negligence in cases of 
ethical spiking is the absence of harm. In contrast, as the masterly Tony Weir observed 
when comparing trespass and negligence: ‘The role of the tort of trespass is quite 
different. Its very function is to protect and vindicate the basic rights of citizens against 
deliberate, even well-meaning invasion, whether or not any damage is caused’.49  
Essentially, an ‘invasion of basic rights’ is precisely what the potential vegan 
claimant envisaged above would have faced. This distinguished scholar was referring 
to rights recognised by the Common Law, long before human rights in their modern 
form had taken shape. Nevertheless, there is of course overlap, as would be expected, 
given that the Common Law tradition was one of the many streams which fed into the 
contemporary human rights framework.50 As previously stated, Common Law does not 
compensate for hurt feelings, but the hypothetical vegan claimant here is not in reality 
complaining first and foremost about the emotional impact of being surreptitiously fed 
animal produce. Indeed, to analyse the situation in those terms is to risk trivialising it, 
because what is being complained of is the very tangible, indeed physical, interference 
with his or her body, and the autonomy to decide what substances should go into it. 
 
 
 
 
49 T Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law (2006) 133.  
50 M Tugenhat, Liberty Intact: Human Rights in English Law (2017) ch  2. 
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Trespass to the person is an ancient element of the legal system, and the lightest of 
touches is capable of amounting to a battery51 if it is not consensual or in the course of 
ordinary social interaction.52 There was at one stage a suggestion that the touching must 
be ‘hostile’,53 but it is now universally accepted that this is not the case.54 As Weir 
points out, a kiss is a battery if it is unwanted by the recipient, even if the kisser’s intent 
is not hostile.55  
In this regard, the law remains as it was set out by Blackstone (and had been since 
long before his time):56 
 
The least touching of another’s person willfully, or in anger, is a battery; for the law cannot draw 
the line between degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first at the lowest stage of 
it; every man’s person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it, in any the 
slightest manner. 
 
It might be objected that there is no actual touching in this instance, and that the courts 
have refused to extend the tort of battery to situations which do not involve physical 
contact. For example, in the famous case of Kaye v Robertson,57 the court was not 
willing to find that flash photography of a patient in hospital constituted battery. 
However, it is important to note that in that instance, there was no bodily contact with 
the plaintiff whatsoever, and as Foster argues, the right which Kaye was trying to assert 
was the right to privacy. He was not concerned with protecting his corporeal integrity 
or autonomy over his own body but, entirely understandably, did not want photographs 
taken without his consent whilst he was critically ill to be plastered all over a national 
newspaper.58 In sharp contrast, in the case of the vegan consuming spiked food, the 
person on the receiving end of the deception physically consumes the animal product. 
It would seem absurd to assert that a pat on the hand could constitute ‘meddling’, 
whereas being caused to involuntarily swallow meat could not. The latter is, without a 
shadow of a doubt, a far greater bodily invasion. 
 
Nevertheless, it cannot be claimed that the application of battery to the factual 
paradigm under consideration is wholly straightforward. Two issues in parti- 
 
 
 
 
51 Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Modern Reports (Mod Rep)149.  
52 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374.  
53 Wilson v Pringle [1986] 2 All ER 440.  
54 See eg Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, per Lord Goff para 73.  
55 Weir (fn 49) 134.  
56 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (1765) Book III 120.  
57 Kaye v Robertson [1991] Fleet Street Reports (FSR) 62.  
58 S Forster, Say Allo, Allo, Wave Goodbye: Remembering the Decision in Kaye v Robertson (2016)  
21 Coventry Law Journal 57. 
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cular must be resolved if this mechanism is to provide a solution: firstly, the in-direct 
application of force in relation to the act of battery, and secondly, the ques-tion of 
intention on the part of the defendant, coupled with the related matter of consent as far 
as the claimant is concerned. 
 
 
1 Indirect application of force 
 
Battery has frequently been understood to require the direct application of force. For 
instance, there is the oft quoted definition from Winfield and Jolowicz: ‘the intentional 
and direct application of force to another person’.59 
However, the concept of directness for these purposes has for centuries been an 
extremely malleable one, and it has arguably now been transmuted to the point of 
extinction in criminal law. Not only would it be logical for the law of tort to follow suit 
in extinguishing it altogether, there is also ample authority to demonstrate that the 
courts have long been prepared to adopt a flexible understanding of what it means to 
directly inflict battery.  
In Gibbons v Pepper60 an action for battery succeeded when the defendant 
whipped a horse, causing it to bolt and trample the plaintiff. There was no need for any 
direct physical contact, a principle again affirmed in R v Cotesworth61 and Pursell v 
Horn,62 cases in which it was respectively concluded that spitting and throwing boiling 
water could amount to battery. In addition to the lack of any need for direct physical 
contact, Gibbons v Pepper also shows that the Common Law does not require there 
to have been an immediate or inevitable link between the defendant’s action and the 
force which inflicted the battery. An intervening action or agent may cause the unlawful 
touching, and there is no need to show that the contact was inevitable. In Gibbons, it 
was obviously not certain that the distressed and abused horse would react exactly as it 
did and collide with the plaintiff.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 W Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (16th edn 2002) 71.  
60 Gibbons v Pepper [1695] 1 Lord Raymond’s Kings Bench Reports (Ld Raym) 38. Whilst this 
con-cerned a procedural debate as to whether action on the case or trespass was the correct form of 
action, debates about case versus trespass foreshadowed later debates about negligence versus trespass. 
Furthermore, procedure and substance cannot readily be separated at this period of Eng-lish legal 
history.  
61 R v Cotesworth (1704) 6 Mod Rep 172; 87 ER 928.  
62 Pursell v Horn (1838) 8 Adolphus and Ellis (Ad & E) 602; 112 ER 966. 
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Scott v Shepherd63 is even more instructive for these purposes. The defendant in 
this case threw a firework (a ‘serpent’ into a covered market, which landed on a very 
surprised gingerbread seller. In understandable panic, he tossed it onto an-other cake-
stall, from whence it was flung in horror by a second vendor, only to eventually explode 
in the unfortunate plaintiff’s face. The defendant tried to argue that his initial action in 
throwing the squib had not injured the plaintiff, and that the serpent had only hit him 
because it was hurled by a third party. The justices were divided in considering this plea 
that trespass did not apply because the force was not direct, but the majority ruled that 
in having instigated a non-consensual game of pass the parcel with a lighted firework, 
the defendant had directly caused the explosive to strike the plaintiff.  
Interestingly, in addition, all of the judges and both counsel were of the view that 
had the defendant turned loose a mad ox in the market, the people whom it gored would 
have been able to bring a trespass action. The question in the minds of the justices and 
serjeants in Scott v Shepherd appears, therefore, to have been one of whether the 
causation was direct, rather than assessing whether there was a direct physical link. All 
things considered, it is crucial to emphasise that it has never been the case in either 
criminal or civil law that the defendant must always, personally, physically apply the 
unlawful force for trespass to lie.  
Furthermore, some rather more recent decisions in the criminal context make it 
abundantly clear that a battery can take place where the victims are tricked or 
manipulated into applying the force to themselves. For example, in K v DPP,64 a 15 
year old schoolboy stole some acid from a chemistry lab and placed it in a hand-drier 
in the boys’ toilets. Afterwards, a fellow pupil attempted to use the hand-drier, the acid 
sprayed out, burning him and causing permanent facial scar-ring. The defendant was 
charged and convicted under s 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1867, and the 
fact that he had not directly applied the force did not mean that he was not responsible 
for its application.  
The outcome of DPP v K is unsurprising, as it has long been recognised that setting 
up a booby trap or engineering a situation in which a victim will run into an object will 
constitute an application of force for the purposes of battery. In Martin65 the defendant 
turned off the gas-lighting in a theatre, placed an iron bar across the door and shouted 
‘fire’. In the stampede to escape several people were badly injured, and the court 
robustly rejected his contention that the law required the force to be applied directly. 
 
 
 
 
63 Scott v Shepherd (1773) 3 Wilson’s Kings Bench and Common Pleas Reports 403; 95 ER 1124.  
64 DPP v K (a minor) [1990] 1 WLR 1067.  
65 R v Martin (1881) 8 QB 54. 
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Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the decision in DPP v K has not 
escaped academic criticism. Hirst went as far as to suggest that it was decided per 
incuriam,66 although it must be acknowledged that his reasoning in doing so was 
extremely tenuous. In a nutshell, he argued67 that the House of Lords in Wilson68 had 
implicitly affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Salisbury  
69 He then went on to suggest that this decision could potentially be construed as 
asserting that battery requires the application of direction force. However, Hirst himself 
accepted that alternative interpretations of Salisbury are possible and that  
the Australian dictum ‘is not a model of clarity’70. Consequently, his claim that DPP v 
K was wrongly decided rests on a doubtful interpretation of an ambiguous statement, 
made obiter, and in authority of merely persuasive status.  
Every link in the chain of reasoning is fragile, and it is unsurprising that neither 
courts nor other authors have been persuaded to follow his analysis. Sjö-  
lin,71 for instance, not only cites DPP v K with approval, but also observes that the 
court took a similar stance in Santa-Bermudez.72 In this case, the defendant told the 
police that he had ‘no sharps’ on his person, which was a lie and the victim suffered a 
needle-stick injury when she pricked herself on a syringe in his pocket.  
Strong parallels can be found between this situation and the vegan restaurant 
customer. In Santa-Bermudez, the police officer brought her hand into contact with 
the needle, the physical action was hers and not the motion of the defendant. 
Nevertheless, in a criminal prosecution for assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm, it 
was decided that this did not transfer the burden of responsibility for the physical 
contact away from the defendant. It was clear that the police woman had  
placed her hand where she did due to the strength of the defendant’s assurance.73 
Similarly, in the case of a spiked vegan, the diner would have consumed the food 
because, and only because, they had been told that it contained no animal pro-ducts. In 
both senses, the false statement by the defendant would be the trigger for the victim’s 
action, and the non-consensual bodily invasion which ensued. On this basis, the 
question of directness might be resolved, but this still leaves the 
 
 
 
66 M Hirst, Assault, Battery and Indirect Violence (1999) Criminal Law Review (Crim L Rev) 557.  
67 Hirst (1999) Crim L Rev 558.  
68 R v Wilson [1984] AC 242.  
69 R v Salisbury [1976] Victorian Reports 452, 461.  
70 Scott v Shepherd (fn 63) 558.  
71 C Sjölin, The Need to Kill Off Zombie Law: Indecent Assault, Where it Went Wrong and How to 
Put It Right (2017) 81 Journal of Criminal Law 50.  
72 Santa-Bermudez [2003] EWHC 2980 (Admin).  
73 The defendant was convicted by the Magistrates’ Court, but appealed successfully to the Crown 
Court. However, the Director of Public Prosecutions appealed further for a ruling on whether the actus 
reus had been established, and the High Court made a determination on this point. 
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matter of intention. The mind of both the defendant and the claimant are key to the 
reasoning applied in these cases. In relation to the defendant, we need to address the 
issue of intention, whilst consent on the part of the claimant is a golden thread which 
runs through both the case law and our analysis. It is the ability to give or withhold 
consent which ultimately ensures that bodily autonomy is maintained and protected. 
 
 
 
2 Intention 
 
Oliphant observes that trespass to the person is one of a family of intentional torts, but 
the only one actionable per se.74 In order to have committed battery, the defendant must 
have intended to apply the unlawful force, but there is no need for any additional 
intention to cause harm or offence. As Oliphant astutely observes, this is because of the 
unique role which trespass to the person has in safe-guarding bodily autonomy75 and, 
due to the special importance of the interest concerned, the bar for intention is set low. 
The focus is on the right of the claimant, not the wrong of the defendant. Bound up with 
this is the issue of consent: what was the claimant agreeing to take place in respect of 
his or her body? If the defendant intentionally strays beyond the bounds of any 
permission given (ex-press or implied) then the consent will not be operative. 
 
Yet for our purposes, this raises the question of whether bringing ethically 
contaminated food into the trespass fold would expose too many people to liability. The 
hypothetical vengeful chef is in a very different position from a conference caterer who 
places a vegan’s name on the wrong list and accidentally serves him or her a lunch 
containing cheese. Should the latter be liable in trespass if a delegate consumes 
something he or she would prefer not to touch? Is the lack of any requirement to show 
malice or an intention to cause harm problematic?  
Arguably it would be, were there not a solution already built into the fabric of the 
tort of battery. As we have seen, everyday social touching will not amount to a battery, 
and interaction within its bounds will not be tortious unless the defendant knew that 
the claimant objected to a type of contact which is otherwise generally deemed 
acceptable.76 The dance between intention and consent is quite a subtle one here, and 
arguably has never been fully drawn out in English law. As high as bodily autonomy is 
prized, tort cannot protect this interest in ways which unjustly 
 
 
 
74 K Oliphant, The Structure of Intentional Torts, in: J Neyers et al (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort 
(2007) 513.  
75 Oliphant (fn 74) 529.  
76 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374. 
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impose liability on third parties, nor make daily life unmanageable. Balancing the rights 
of potential defendants and claimants is not straightforward, which is why the 
interaction between intention and consent is complex.  
In concrete terms, jostling by a crowd in a busy station is not battery. Some older 
authorities explained this on the basis of implied consent,77 but following the dicta of 
Goff LJ in Collins v Willcock the prevailing view is now that there is a general 
exception which removes routine social interaction from the ambit of tres-pass to the 
person.78 Nevertheless, there is a further layer of complexity here. Where a defendant 
is fully aware that a specific individual objects to a touch which would ordinarily fall 
within this general exception then, reasoning from first principles, it is surely the case 
that an action for battery would lie if a defen-dant intentionally inflicted such touching.  
It is true that a hypothetical claimant could not expect to stand in the middle of 
Oxford Circus tube station during the rush hour and demand to sue everyone who 
inadvertently brushed or bumped into them, on the basis that they had been yelling 
‘Don’t touch me!’ at the time. Clearly, touching of a kind which is unavoidable and 
essentially unintentional cannot reasonably impose liability on a defendant, and 
equally, it would be grossly unfair to render a defendant liable for giving a colleague a 
friendly pat on the shoulder, because the recipient harboured an entirely secret hatred 
of being touched. Ordinary social interaction as envisaged in Collins v Willcock must, 
in general terms, be an objective standard of behaviour, but what about the case where 
the defendant is fully aware that the person in question does not wish to patted? Surely 
an action must lie here for gratuitous, avoidable and intentional touching, based on the 
expressed, subjective wishes of the person receiving the touch? Otherwise, no action 
would lie where a malicious person touched a Muslim or Orthodox Jewish individual 
of the opposite sex with the intention of causing them distress, or wished to torment 
someone on the autistic spectrum who loathed physical contact. That conclusion would 
run counter to the objective of protecting bodily autonomy, and is not demanded in 
order to safeguard defendants from unjust or onerous burdens.  
Of course, it might be argued that this can be explained on the basis of Collins v 
Willcock, given that deliberately touching someone with the aim of upsetting them is 
not actually within ordinary social interaction. A mild degree of friendly, non-sexual 
touching between non-related people is normal in UK culture, but only where it is 
assumed that it will be welcomed. As reasonable people do not 
 
 
 
 
 
77 Rawlings v Till (1837) 3. Meeson & Welsby’s Reports (Eng).  
78 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374. 
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poke others just to make them miserable, a lack of subjective consent can some-times 
take behaviour outside of the general exception.  
Consequently, in the context of this kind of spiking, intention would not re-quire 
malice or a desire to harm, but simply a conscious intent to bring the claimant into 
contact with a substance, knowing that they objected on ethical grounds. If the person 
providing the food did not know that the recipient objected to it, there would be no 
trespass. Causing someone to touch a ham roll is not generally outside of the bounds of 
normal social interaction, but is the specific, knowingly non-consensual nature of the 
touch which makes the spiking of food unlawful.  
However, the converse consideration also applies: a defendant would not be able 
to rely on the consent of the victim as a defence, if he or she only consented to eat food 
because they were deceived as to its nature. For example, deception and concealment 
are now accepted as being capable of rendering sexual activity battery, even though the 
victim was a willing participant at the time when the act took place.79 In short, infecting 
a partner with a sexually transmitted disease, when they did not consent to this risk, is 
capable of transforming the sexual con-tact in question into an offence against the 
person. The deception negated the consent, because the victim had not agreed to have 
sexual intercourse with a partner known to be HIV positive. Therefore, deception about 
collateral aspects of the act, as well as the act itself, are sufficient to vitiate consent in 
this context. Note that as Welsh observes, this has not been characterised as rape, but 
the infliction of bodily harm.80 There are obviously complex social and legal issues 
concerning the intervention of criminal law in sexual relationships which do not re-late 
to the current discussion, but the point for present purposes is that deception can render 
an ostensibly consensual action an assault. 
 
For the sake of completeness, it should be recognised that in the medical context, 
the UK legal system has consistently resisted characterising a failure to fully disclose 
risks about a procedure as vitiating consent, rendering the doctor’s action trespass, and 
such claims must be pursued in the realm of negligence in-stead.81 As Tavares points 
out, the recent Court of Appeal decision in Shaw v Ko-vas82 not only affirms the 
conventional wisdom on this issue, but also rejects the use of any human rights based 
argument to deem consent given without adequate explanation a nullity.83 (The 
litigation concerned a claim brought following heart- 
 
 
 
79 R v Dica[2004] 3 ALL ER 593; R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706.  
80 L Welsh, Intent to Harm (2017) 181 Justice of the Peace 795.  
81 See eg Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; Shaw v Kovac [2017] 
EWCA Civ 1028.  
82 Shaw v Kovas and University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust [2017] 1 WLR 4773.  
83 N Tavares, Shaw v Kovac (2017) 4 Journal of Personal Injury Law 218. 
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surgery on an 86 year old patient, who had not given informed consent and died during 
the procedure. The court considered this aspect of the case at length and explicitly ruled 
that no separate award should be given to reflect this deprivation of autonomy). 
Nevertheless, we would suggest that the professional duty of clinicians to communicate 
effectively with patients is correctly categorised as a particular area of medical law, and 
not analogous to the spiked vegan situation. The policy implications of concluding that 
doctors were committing unlawful assaults on patients if they failed to make adequate 
professional disclosures would be considerable. The obligation to give full and 
adequate information is one which should quite properly be regulated by the law of 
professional negligence, but this is not a debate which we should initiate here.  
The key point for our analysis is that the general law of trespass has the potential 
to furnish a vegan diner with a remedy if they were to discover that their food had been 
tampered with. Their bodily autonomy would have suffered a violation to which they 
did not consent, and it is the function of this branch of tort to address this. The issue is 
not whether any demonstrable harm was caused in the sense of physical or psychiatric 
injury, but whether the perpetrator’s deliberate actions could have caused the claimant 
to have a physical substance enter his or her body when he or she did not wish for this 
to happen. Viewed through this lens, the law of trespass appears entirely appropriate. 
 
Having said which, we do acknowledge that using trespass in this way is venturing 
into new ground. More conservative observers might find the issue of directness in 
particular to be a stumbling block, arguing that the cases founded upon indirect contact 
are an aberration (although given the antiquity and established status of some of the 
authorities, we would strongly dispute the cogency of such a stance).84 Therefore, it 
would be fruitful to carry out further analysis about whether there are any factors in the 
wider legal framework which might incline judicial thought towards accepting our 
proposed solution. 
 
 
III Human rights 
 
One important area to explore in this regard is human rights. As McCorkingdale argues, 
the current British structure of human rights is complex, but based around ‘the twin 
pillars of Convention and common law rights jurisprudence’.85 We would also endorse 
Wright’s contention that these binary streams are not 
 
 
 
84 See discussion above.  
85 C McCorkindale, Brexit and Human Rights (2018) 22 Edinburgh Law Review 126. 
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fused, despite the obvious and significant influence and interaction between them.86 For 
this reason, we shall consider these aspects of the current framework sequentially, 
beginning with Convention rights and moving to Common Law rights, although we will 
of course discuss the impact of the former on the latter.  
However, in turning to Convention law rights, we must first address which articles 
are most likely to be engaged where an individual is tricked into consuming food which 
is repugnant to their belief system. 
 
 
A Convention rights 
 
One right to consider where the violation of religious belief or ethical principle is 
concerned is undoubtedly art 9, which exists precisely in order to defend freedom of 
conscience and religion. Not only does it confer an absolute right to hold beliefs upon 
fundamental matters, it also provides that the right to manifest such beliefs can only be 
limited in so far as is prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. It is now 
well established that vegan beliefs can attract the shield of art 9, and that the avoidance 
of animal products is the most obvious manifestation of such beliefs.87 However, it is 
worth pausing to ask whether all vegans would have access to this article.  
In a recent family law case concerning a mother who opposed vaccinations for her 
children, in part on the basis of her vegan ethical views, the court asserted that veganism 
‘is not a religion, it is a lifestyle’.88 Furthermore, courts have explicitly acknowledged 
that89 people become vegans for a wide variety of reasons, including health concerns, 
medical needs, ethical issues and religious convictions. Consequently, there are some 
doubt as to whether all professed vegans could rely upon art 9, or only those for whom 
a vegan lifestyle is in a fact a manifestation of a qualifying belief.  
The House of Lords in R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment90 laid down guidance on the types of beliefs which would qualify for 
protection under art 9. A requisite level of seriousness and importance must at-tach to 
them, they must be on a fundamental matter and they must be sufficiently  
 
 
86 J Wright, Tort Law and Human Rights (2017) 308–311.  
87 ECtHR Jakobski v Poland, 7.12.2010, no 18429/06, 1974; H v UK (1991) No 18187/91.  
88 C v EF (In the matter of M and N) [2016] England and Wales Family Court (EWFC) 69 (Fam) 
per Rogers J, para 67.  
89 Alpro Ltd v HMRC (2006) West Law 3880346.  
90 R (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment 
UKHL 15 [2005] 2 AC 246. 
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coherent. Nevertheless, the court also acknowledged that religious beliefs in par-ticular 
did not need to be rational or logical in objective terms, as that is not ne-cessarily always 
the nature of faith. This is in harmony with the general approach taken by the 
Strasbourg Court in recognising that the article is engaged,91 and also approved by 
commentators who affirm the inherent inappropriateness of legal frameworks treating 
religious practice and identity, as phenomena which can be verified or dismissed 
according to external criteria.92  
Bearing this in mind, it would appear very difficult to justify regarding non-
religious matters of belief or conscience within the ambit of art 9 as different from 
religious ones. The text of the article makes no distinction between categories of 
beliefs, and to demand that non-religious applicants clear a higher hurdle to ac-cess 
protection would, in itself, be discriminatory. As a result, it is reasonable to assert that 
non-religiously motivated vegans would not be required to demonstrate that their 
understanding of veganism could be objectively justified in abstract intellectual terms, 
in order to qualify for protection. Thus whether a particular vegan chose to consume 
honey93 or feed meat to obligate carnivore pets would not have any bearing on their 
access to art 9, irrespective of debates within vegan-ism and wider society about the 
internal coherence of such decisions.  
However, Temperman demonstrates that an applicant wishing to rely on art 9 must 
also be able to assert that the underlying belief is held with sincerity.94 The 
genuineness of a belief is very different from its logic or lucidity, and religious and 
non-religious beliefs alike must be held in earnest if art 9 is to apply. It is interesting 
how this may play out in a context like veganism, where some individuals may elect to 
avoid animal-products on some occasions, but not others. Nevertheless, given that art 
9 uncontroversially encompasses the freedom to change religious beliefs, there is no 
reason to assert that ‘part-time’ vegans would be excluded from its ambit.95 The 
requirement of genuineness exists to filter out applicants who may be dissimulating for 
ulterior motives, but not to demand unwavering ideological commitment, as this would 
undermine the very liberty which it seeks to protect. In terms of interests recognised by 
the legal framework, 
 
 
 
 
 
91 See eg ECtHR Dogru v France, 4.12.2008, no 27058/05 and Kervanci v France, 4.12.2008, no 
31645/04.  
92 R Domingo, God and the Secular Legal System (2016).  
93 N Sweeney, Bees-at-Law (2017) 312–315. Sweeney explores different philosophical 
perspectives on the human use of bees and their status as creatures.  
94 J Temperman, Freedom of Religion or Belief in Prison A Critical Analysis of the European 
Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence (2017) 6 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 48.  
95 Re L (Religious Upbringing) [2010] EWHC 2503. 
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the freedom is to not simply hold beliefs, but to discard and develop them without 
adverse consequences.  
However, in the recent High Court decision in Re M,96 the court appeared to add 
a further gloss in relation to beliefs passing through the filter of art  9. The appellate 
court expressed doubts about whether beliefs, which were incompatible with the values 
of a liberal democratic society, would meet the threshold for pro-tection,97 but it should 
be stressed that the remarks were obiter and by no means unproblematic. In fact, if only 
views which conform to the values of mainstream society are shielded by art  9, it is 
difficult to see how it can be expected to protect vulnerable, and perhaps unpopular, 
minorities from oppressive or unfavourable treatment. As Rubenstein98 argues, 
shielding minority groups from majoritarian tyranny is an accepted obligation for a 
liberal democratic State, and both domes-tic courts and Strasburg have repeatedly 
recognised the application of art 9 to non-liberal beliefs.99 We would not seek to build 
too much on obiter dicta trans-planted from its original context, and in any case, there 
is certainly no suggestion that veganism poses a challenge to liberal democratic society, 
but for present purposes it is important to note this recent and clear judicial message 
that not all beliefs will be simply waved through the gateway of art 9. Courts will 
scrutinise the factual context before them, and certainly will reject some attempts at 
asserting qualifying beliefs, as Jones v UK also demonstrated.100 
 
Yet, it remains true that where a positive belief is asserted, courts rarely test its 
robustness without some tangible reason to either be suspicious, or err on the side of 
caution. In Vartic v Romania,101 the Strasbourg Court was unsympathetic to the State’s 
attempt to assert that a prisoner was simply angling for better food in demanding a 
special religious diet in conformity with his Buddhist faith, even though it was admitted 
that his motivation partly related to his health. It is significant that the beliefs subjected 
to doubt in Re M102 were being asserted as the 
 
 
 
96 Re M (Children) (Contact: Ultra-Orthodox Judaism: Transgender Parent) [2017] EWFC 4; [2017] 
4 WLR 201 81 R.  
97 Ibid para 121: ‘[A] religious belief, practice or observance that was inconsistent with the princi-ple 
of non-discrimination under that legislation is not compatible with the requirements of our society. If 
that was so, the belief, practice or observance in question might not achieve the level required for art  9 
protection’.  
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99 Eweida v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37; R (on the application of Ngole) v University of 
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foundation for discriminatory behaviour against a transgender individual and their 
minor children. Moreover, the context was material to the way in which the court 
analysed the beliefs at hand and unquestionably a situation involving an adult 
voluntarily abstaining from animal-products, and harming nobody in the process, 
would be dramatically different. There is nothing about veganism in general terms 
which would actively invite exceptional scrutiny from judges.  
Even so, there must logically still be some limits in accessing art 9 for vegans 
motivated by health concerns, rather than ethical ones. Otherwise, parity of treatment 
would logically demand that individuals who chose to follow diets free from gluten or 
processed sugar or low in cholesterol could request that this be catered for by public 
authorities, on the basis of a right to freedom of religion and belief. As discussed 
below, there may be alternative Convention rights at play in situations like these, but 
not the one targeted at defending ideological liberty.  
Nevertheless, even accepting that the borders of art 9 are not wide enough to 
encompass all vegans in all circumstances, there is reason to anticipate that the 
boundaries will be generously interpreted. It is uncontroversial that a very large number 
of vegans have followed that pathway in deference to deep personal con-victions, and 
as such entirely properly attract the safeguards of human rights law.  
Furthermore, public authorities would do well to take cognisance of this reality, as 
Fouzder demonstrated in relation to a recent controversy involving an NHS  Trust.103 
An advertisement had been placed for an occupational therapist in an eating disorders 
service and stated explicitly that any applicants who adopted vegan diets would be 
excluded from consideration. This was challenged by the International Vegan Rights 
Alliance, as well as Barbara Bolton, a solicitor and vegan activist. The Trust hastily 
backtracked and amended the advertisement104 significantly, by removing the caveat 
altogether, rather than attempting to differentiate between various categories of vegans. 
Bolton correctly observed that the previous advertisement was discriminatory, and that 
veganism has been consistently recognised as a protected belief for the purposes of 
international and domestic law. It is evident that in general terms, discrimination 
against vegans will engage human rights and also fall foul of equality law,105 and that 
even if a sub-category of those adopting a vegan lifestyle may have difficulty accessing 
the shield of art 9, the default assumption must be that it will be engaged where vegans 
are concerned. 
 
 
 
 
 
103 M Fouzder, Vegan Challenges Discriminatory Job Ad (2017) 30 Law Society Gazette.  
104 Apology after job advert discriminates against vegans, Plant based news, 14  June 2017 <http 
s://www.plantbasednews.org/post/apology-after-job-advert-discriminates-against-vegans>.  
105 Equality Act 2010, sec 4. Protected characteristics include ‘religion and belief’. 
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In light of all of this, there is reason to assert that the art 9 rights of vegans are 
engaged in relation to assuring that their ethical dietary choices are respected whilst 
eating in public. The same would, of course, be the case in respect of Jews, Hindus, 
Buddhists, Muslims and any other faith group with doctrinal food restrictions. There is 
no controversy about the premise that the UK legal framework post 1998 recognises 
freedom of belief as a fundamental interest demanding protection. 
 
Nevertheless, this is not the only Convention article which has relevance in this 
context, as there is also the right to private and family life.106 As we outlined at the 
beginning of our analysis, we are also concerned with an individual’s interest in bodily 
autonomy, in deciding what they do or do not wish to consume. Both Strasburg and the 
domestic courts have consistently taken an expansive approach to art 8, and the interests 
which come within its ambit. It is accepted that the right encompasses the freedom to 
make decisions in a medical context, relating to the treatment of one’s own body,107 and 
interference with corporeal autonomy, in the form of temporary detention and forcible 
touching of the kind involved in the use of police stop and search powers may be 
sufficient to infringe its terms.108 It is, therefore, reasonable to assert that a court would 
be willing to conclude that causing an individual to consume foodstuffs in opposition 
to their personal choices would interfere with their right to privacy as bodily invasions 
are, after all, even more intimate than violation of the home. Moreover, access to art 8 
is not dependent upon any qualifying belief or identifiable principle, so applicants 
would not have to clear hurdles comparable to those set out above in relation to art  9. 
 
Taking the foregoing into account, it can be asserted with confidence that the 
victims of spiking incidents of the kind under consideration would be able to demon-
strate that their arts 8 and 9 rights had been engaged. Furthermore, where Convention 
rights are interfered with, it is not necessary for an applicant to show that public 
authorities are responsible for the relevant infringement, because the State has an 
obligation to ensure that individuals have appropriate legal recourse if their rights are 
violated or curtailed.109 It goes without saying that this does not automatically mean 
that the rights in question will be vindicated in all cases, as neither art 8110 nor 
 
 
 
106 Art 8 ECHR.  
107 ECtHR Pretty v United Kingdom, 27.7.2002, no 2346/02 [2002] ECHR 423; The Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application [2015] Northern Ireland Queen’s Bench 96.  
108 Gillian and Quinton v UK [2010] ECHR 28.  
109 Eweida v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37.  
110 We have included the full wording of each, as the grounds for limitation are subtly but signifi-
cantly different. Art 8(2): ‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
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art 9111 confer absolute freedoms, and in fact on many occasions Convention rights 
must necessarily be balanced against competing rights and societal interests.112 
However, national authorities must be able to show that an appropriate balancing 
exercise has been carried out, and it is exceedingly difficult to imagine such an as-
sessment properly concluding that the denial of effective legal protection and re-dress 
for individuals, when faced with a malicious spiking incident, was in fact a justifiable 
limitation of their rights. Strikingly, such a stance would serve no obvious benign 
purpose, and it would actively undermine some of the legitimate societal aims set out 
in the qualifications contained in arts 8(2) and 9(2) respectively, for ex-ample, 
advancing public safety, preventing disorder and protecting order.  
Bearing all this in mind, there is clear pressure stemming from the Convention to 
award victims of this type of spiking some potential remedy for their violated interests, 
in terms of both freedom of belief and bodily autonomy. Having reached this 
conclusion, we are now bound to ask by what mechanisms the cur-rent English and 
Welsh framework provides for the practical defence of these rights. In fact, the causes 
of action which can currently be identified are indivisibly linked with the concept of 
Common Law rights, as the former can only become understood and made incarnate 
through the latter. 
 
 
B Common law rights 
 
As previously discussed, it is well established that in England and Wales human rights 
are derived from a variety of sources.113 The rights recognised by Common Law are 
primarily manifested, as well as vindicated, through private law reme-dies,114 and 
whilst it is true that, as Corbett maintains, there is no universal or cohesive underlying 
theory of tort law, some overarching principles are identifi-  
 
 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the pre-
vention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.’  
111 Art 9(2): ‘Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’  
112 Lee v McArthur & Ors [2016] Northern Ireland Court of Appeal 29.  
113 M Elliott/S Tierney/A Young, Human Rights Post-Brexit: The Need For Legislation? Public Law 
for Everyone, 8 February 2018 <https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2018/02/08/human-right s-post-
brexit-the-need-for-legislation/>.  
114 Parkinson v St James NHS Trust [2001] EWCA 530. 
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able.115 It should be stressed that the nature and scope of Common Law rights remains 
a controversial topic, and there is by no means universal acceptance of the concept of 
free-standing rights existing independently of remedial torts, and championed by 
authors like Stevens.116 Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court’s re-cent declarations in 
the R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor case have reminded us it is impossible to deny 
that one key function of tort is to uphold the rule of law through the defence of 
individual and collective rights.117  
It is often the case that, as Moreham argues, Common Law rights march in step 
with those conferred by the Convention and Human Rights Act,118 and as a result, it is 
not always necessary for judges to disentangle whether and when they are responding 
to a requirement imposed arising from the domestic legal setting, rather than the 
international instrument. Moreham was writing in the context of the right to privacy, 
and how breach of confidence branched out from its original ambit, of preventing 
disclosures of private information revealed within confidential relationships, to a far 
more expansive remit. The impulse from art 8 was pushing in the same direction as the 
organic evolution of Common Law, and consequently, the driving forces were 
effectively fused.  
As Hartshorne119 observes, the nature of our juridical system means that Com-mon 
Law evolves, incrementally, and by stepping-stones. However, judges do not have the 
capacity to conjure solutions to perceived problems from thin air nor to spin legal gold 
from straw, but must work within the confines of pre-existing materials. The mere fact 
that they recognise a need derived from a Convention right will not, in itself, allow them 
to formulate a convenient response, unless there are suitable existing principles with 
which to work. This allows for what Phillipson terms ‘weak horizontal direct effect’120 
building on the earlier work of scholars like Hunt.121 In other words, courts would not 
give direct effect to a Convention article in the strict sense, but would allow it to mould 
their interpretation of Common Law. For our purposes, it is consequently reasonable to 
suggest that the traffic 
 
 
 
 
115 V Corbett, The Promotion of Human Dignity: A Theory of Tort Law (2017) 58 Irish Jurist 121.  
116 R Stevens, Torts and Rights (2007).  
117 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) 51 per Lord 
Reed paras 66–80.  
118 N Moreham, Douglas and Others v Hello-the Protection of Privacy in English Private Law 
(2001) 64 MLR 767.  
119 J Hartshorne, The Need for an Intrusion upon Seclusion Privacy Tort within English Law (2017)  
46 (4) Common Law World Review 287.  
120 G Phillipson, The Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal Effect’ and the Common Law: A Bang or a 
Whimper? (1999) MLR 824.  
121 M Hunt, The Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Act (1998) Public Law (PL) 423, 442. 
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between both arts 8 and 9 and Common Law would incline judges towards moulding a 
solution from trespass if the opportunity presented itself.  
Nevertheless, whilst this is an important point to appreciate, it is also vital not to 
imagine that the Common Law rights are fused with, subsumed within or de-rived from 
Convention rights (or indeed rights flowing from EU law when these may be applicable 
as well or instead). Significantly, in UNISON122 the Supreme Court analysed the right 
to access to justice, and was at great pains to stress that the Common Law right was 
independent from the rights generated by art 6, as well as the requirement to provide an 
effective remedy in respect of EU law. The Common Law right was a stand-alone 
concept, which would survive were the others washed away. Lord Reed even stressed 
that whilst the Common Law right was subject to a principle which functioned very 
much like proportionality, this was distinct and an example of convergent evolution by 
two legal frameworks.123  
This is a crucial consideration in relation to the Common Law right with which we 
are most directly concerned for present purposes: the right to bodily integrity. As 
Herring and Wall convincingly demonstrate, this is a specific right recognised by the 
English legal framework,124 and as they note,125 Hale LJ de-scribed it as ‘the first and 
most important of the interests protected by the law of tort’.126 This is undoubtedly true, 
and the reason why criminal cases are still relevant to our present discussion is that 
trespass to the person is such an ancient facet of our legal system that it pre-dates the 
separation of civil and criminal law.127 
 
In a nutshell, the right of individuals to determine what happens to their body is a 
basic and long-standing principle within the English and Welsh legal sys-tem,128 and it 
is difficult to deny that forcing a vegan to not merely touch, but actually ingest, animal 
products, is a dramatic affront to their corporeal self-de-termination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.  
123 Ibid per Lord Reed para 89.  
124 J Herring/J Wall, The Nature and Significance of the Right to Bodily Integrity (2017) 
Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 566, 584.  
125 Ibid, 566.  
126 Parkinson v St James NHS Trust [2001] EWCA 530.  
127 Baker, An Introduction to Legal History (4th edn 2002) 60–63.  
128 Ibid, 402–405, 472–477. 
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IV The Spanish paradigm 
 
So far, our discussion has revealed that the well-established right to bodily auton-omy 
embedded in the English and Welsh system is key to finding a satisfactory response to 
our core question. We now pause to consider the very different ap-proach which might 
emerge to a similar factual paradigm in Spain, asking how a context which understands 
and weighs fundamental interests differently, deals with safeguarding both bodily 
autonomy and freedom of belief, when it comes to the deliberate ethical contamination 
of food.  
At the very beginning of this analysis, we should reiterate well-trodden ground, 
highlighting Brüggemeier’s observation that there is no such thing as European tort law, 
and further, that the ‘pigeon-hole’ approach of individual torts is a feature of the 
Common Law tradition not manifested elsewhere.129 Further-more, we should also 
stress at the outset that, as Bachmaier, Gomez-Jara and Ruda demonstrate: ‘the Spanish 
legal system positively fosters the eradication of any clear divide between tort and 
crime’.130  
In other words, there is no hard border between these two legal territories in the 
Spanish model, counter intuitive though this may seem to contemporary English jurists. 
When it comes to crimes, offenders may be brought into the justice system either via 
public authorities, or at the instigation of private parties who have suffered as a result. 
Equally, victims may choose to use mechanisms to obtain compensation rooted in either 
the Criminal or Civil Code.  
Consequently, there are two distinct potential routes by which a Spanish victim of 
ethical contamination might seek redress: 1) pursuant to art 109 of the Spanish Criminal 
Code; or 2) via art 1902 of the Civil Code. Whenever a criminal offence is committed 
and a third party has suffered harm as a result, art 109 instantly and automatically 
generates a right for the injured third party to bring a civil claim. It should also be noted 
that civil claims can also arise where no crime has been committed, but where art 1902 
of the Civil Code nevertheless bites and produces extra-contractual liability. Criminal 
liability which injures third parties cannot exist independently of civil liability, by virtue 
of art 109, but there are some circumstances in which purely tortious liability does exist, 
and a civil action will lie even though no criminal offence has been committed.  
Both the Criminal Code and the Civil Code contain relevant provisions which 
safeguard essential interests of individuals within the Spanish jurisdiction, in- 
 
 
 
129 G Brüggemeier, Protection of personality rights in the law of delict/torts in Europe, in: G Brüg-
gemeier/A Colombi Ciacchi/ PO Callaghan (eds), Personality Rights in European Tort Law (2010) 5.  
130 L Bachmaier/C Gomez-Jara/A Ruda, Blurred Boundaries in Spanish Tort and Crime, in: M 
Dy-son (ed), Comparing Tort and Crime: Learning Across Legal Systems (2015) 225. 
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cluding the two with which we are concerned here: freedom of belief and bodily 
autonomy. As is the case in England and Wales, and indeed most other paradigms, the 
underlying rationale for a law is not always stated explicitly in its text. Nevertheless, as 
we shall see in our discussion, the wording and effect of the pro-visions in question 
make it clear that protection of these interests is at least one part of their ambit. For the 
sake of clarity, we will consider liability arising from the Criminal Code first, before 
moving on to possible actions brought using the Civil Code. 
 
 
A Article 109 Criminal Code 
 
As stated, this provision gives persons who are harmed by the criminal behaviour of 
another the right to bring an action for compensation.131 Consequently, in situations 
where in the UK paradigm civil and criminal liability would run in parallel, for 
example, where the defendant launches an unprovoked physical assault on the victim 
claimant, in Spain civil liability arises directly out of the criminal act or omission. 
Furthermore, there is scope for relatives of the primary victim and also third parties 
who have been affected to bring an action.132 This caveat is extremely important, as it 
would circumvent some of the difficulties which arise in an English and Welsh context, 
where the purchaser of food might have a contractual remedy, but others who consumed 
it would not have this recourse.  
Article 109 functions as a piggy-back provision, and requires a criminal of-fence 
to be present in order for it to be engaged. This overview of the potential articles which 
might be triggered in this context reveals a very different focus between the English 
and Spanish systems in the conception and protection of bodily autonomy and freedom 
of belief. There is no parallel concept to common assault in Spanish criminal law, and 
touching another person in a non-sexual way which causes no physical harm is not an 
offence, meaning that art 109 can-not bite merely for non-consensual, intentional 
touching. We must, consequently, consider what kind of substantive provisions might 
apply in the scenarios we are considering, opening the door to an art 109 claim.  
The first possibility is art 282 of the Spanish Criminal Code, which criminalises 
the making of false claims about goods or services, where these cause harm to 
customers. This harm need not be material or economic, and could, as a result, include 
the distress caused by the realisation of having consumed food which 
 
 
 
131 Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal (Penal Code) art  109.1.  
132 Penal Code art 113. 
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violated personal beliefs or ethics.133 Another similar, but distinct, possibility would be 
art 363, which deals with the trading in comestibles which are harmful to health. The 
thrust of this article concerns food hygiene, and it might be challenging to interpret it 
as covering products which were not physically toxic, but it does expressly include the 
traffic of ‘corrupted’ goods.134 Bearing this in mind, the question would be whether a 
court would be prepared to interpret ‘corrupted’ to encompass doctrinal, rather than 
physical corruption.  
It should be highlighted that these provisions are aimed primarily at protecting 
individuals from bodily harm, rather than defending corporeal autonomy. Nonetheless, 
if an expansive definition of harm is adopted, victims would benefit from fairly robust 
protection afforded by art 109, and possibly also art 282 of the same Code. Given, as we 
have noted, that there is also a provision which brings injured third parties within these 
parameters, the complexity brought about by privity of contract in a UK setting does 
not arise. In addition, art 120 imposes something akin to vicarious liability, rendering 
employers and others accountable in civil law for the crimes of their workers or agents. 
So, a business owner could not escape the obligation to pay compensation by arguing 
that their employees perpetrated the contamination, although, as with any form of 
vicarious liability, there will be scope for uncertainty about when an individual was or 
was not acting for another.135 
 
Nevertheless, there remains the troubling issue of malicious individuals who are 
not in any kind of commercial relationship with the victims. What about the stranger 
who, in an opportunistic or perhaps even premeditated fashion, targets someone for this 
form of abuse, motivated by either personal or collective hatred? It is here that the 
difference in the underlying values of the two systems is most marked, and arguably 
too, this is the most likely scenario in the ordinary course of events. 
 
Generally speaking, businesses are keen not to cause dissatisfaction, much less 
distress, to their customers.136 So, we must focus on the protection of indivi 
 
 
133 Penal Code art 110. 3.  
134 Penal Code art 363.3 ‘Traficando con géneros corrompidos’.  
135 This differing approach towards making third parties legally liable for criminal acts is a clear out 
working of the fusion between tort and crime in the Spanish paradigm. Making an innocent party 
responsible for the crime of another would be anathema to most Common Law commentators, but the 
intermingling of public and private wrongs and redress makes this less problematic.  
136 Aside from the Goodman case, instances of deception by commercial enterprises have usually 
arisen from cynical attempts to increase profit margins by sourcing cheaper meat. ‘What are the 
chances your lamb curry is actually beef?’ The Telegraph 9 February 2015 <https://www.tele 
graph.co.uk/news/shopping-and-consumer-news/11401670/What-are-the-chances-your-lamb-c urry-
is-actually-beef.html>. 
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duals from mischievous interference by strangers, and in this regard, the most 
promising provisions in the Spanish setting are targeted not at bodily integrity, but at 
freedom of belief. As previously stated, the Spanish Criminal Code does not have a 
conception of bodily integrity which imposes a general prohibition on touching in the 
absence of injury, a sexual element or associations with domestic abuse137 and, 
consequently, there is nothing directly analogous to common as-sault in criminal law 
and battery in the English and Welsh tortious context. As a result, outside of the 
commercial sphere, we are driven to look at provisions protecting religious freedom if 
we are to find a route to claim under art 109.  
In contrast with bodily autonomy, where the English system takes a more 
expansive view of protecting the interest, the Spanish setting adopts a more focused 
approach to safeguarding and protection in relation to freedom of reli-gion.138 Whilst 
the English framework tends towards showing a supportive stance to the practice of 
religion and manifestation of conscience,139 it does not have any overarching provision 
criminalising impeding such activities. In certain circumstances, a particular form of 
hate crime may be applicable,140 but molesting or hindering a person or group of people 
from expressing their beliefs is not pro-scribed as an offence in its own right.  
This position is striking when juxtaposed with the Spanish Criminal Code, which 
specifically outlaws impeding religious practice of others, particularly via arts 522–
523,141 and it is difficult to find many more unpleasant and dramatic interferences than 
deliberately spiking a person’s food with material known to be abhorrent to their belief 
system. Thus the Jewish, Muslim or Hindu victim of this  
 
 
 
 
137 Penal Code arts 147–155.  
138 See S Cañamares, Libertad Religiosa e Igualdad: Algunos Supuestos Discutidos (2011) Revista 
General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado. This author carries out an interest-
ing analysis of the relationship between religious freedom and the principle of equality.  
139 J Garcἱa Oliva/H Hall, Religion, Law and the Constitution: Balancing Beliefs in Britain (2017) 
chs 2–3. Independently of art 9, the Common Law has also developed in a way which protects free-dom 
of belief and conscience. Historically, the members and purposes of the Church of England were 
favoured, but when this became politically and philosophically unacceptable in the course of the 
nineteenth century, the general trend was to address inequality by widening the reach of legal benefit. 
If Anglican religion needed to be accommodated and respected, then firstly other forms of Christianity, 
and latterly other faiths also had to be accorded the same treatment. From here on it was a natural step 
to recognise non-religious matters of conscience, for example, granting pacifists exemption from 
conscription, regardless of whether their objection lay in faith, politics or philoso-phy, eg Military 
Service Act 1916.  
140 See eg the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended).  
141 Penal Code art 522f. 
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kind of behaviour has a clearer and more sharply defined path to a remedy than is 
currently the case in England and Wales.  
Regrettably though, there is a sharp sting in the tail. As the work of Martínez-
Torrón demonstrates,142 these provisions undoubtedly cover atheists, agnostics and 
humanists, and this position is well supported by case law.143 However, it is uncertain 
whether those adopting veganism for ethical reasons not tied to religion could access 
this protection. The text of the Criminal Code itself suggests not, as the reference to 
religious beliefs is clear. If tested, a court might nevertheless be prepared to construe 
these provisions as covering other convictions under the ambit of art  9, but it would be 
difficult to suggest any obligation on the part of a Spanish court to do this, flowing from 
domestic, EU equality law,144 or the provisions of the ECHR.145 Neither the wording 
of the legal instruments nor judicial pronouncements in case law imply that legislation 
targeted at protecting religious freedom must encompass all forms of freedom of 
conscience.  
Another alternative avenue might be potentially via art 173, which deals with 
‘torturas y otros delitos contra la integridad moral’ (torture and other crimes against 
moral integrity’).146 This could, theoretically, be applied in conjunction with the 
provisions of art 22.4, which lists hatred or prejudice based on a number of 
characteristics, including religion or belief, as an aggravating circumstance of a 
criminal offence.147 The problem, however, is that the threshold between strangers is 
intended to be a very high one. The law distinguishes between torture, and other forms 
of degrading treatment, and only torture is criminalised between strangers, whilst lesser 
forms of abuse require a concrete, pre-existing relation-ship with a person or a place, 
applying in an employment or domestic context. Deeply unpleasant and distressing 
though tampering with a person’s food undoubtedly is, it is hard to imagine that it could 
be construed as ‘torture’, when this concept is explicitly distinguished from degrading 
treatment more generally. Consequently, in our view, these provisions also would not 
avail.  
All in all, it appears that whilst religiously motivated vegans are well served by 
these provisions, those driven by ethical concerns may struggle to access the 
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144 Directiva 2004/83/CE; STJUE, Gran Sala de 5 sept 2012.  
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protection in the Spanish context. Furthermore, individuals who choose to be vegan for 
the benefit of their health will clearly be excluded completely.  
Therefore, if a malicious individual contaminated a non-religious vegan’s food 
with meat juices, and it did them no harm, the criminal law would not readily provide 
redress. Would the Civil Code by any more promising? 
 
 
B Article 1902 of the Civil Code 
 
As we have discussed, this second avenue applies to situations where the Crim-inal 
Code does not extend. Article 1902 is broadly drafted, and simply requires a defendant 
to pay reparation where he or she has caused damage to another party, either by 
fault/intention or negligence. The text of the Civil Code does not itself define what is 
meant by damage,148 but as Medina Alcoz argues, case law has demonstrated that it 
includes what within the Spanish system is termed ‘moral damage’.149 Unfortunately, 
as we have already seen, and as authors like Sánchez González150 and also Díez-
Picazo151 eloquently demonstrate, the ambit of moral damage is by no means easy to 
pin down in the Spanish context. Moreover, it is undeniable that the concept continues 
to evolve, both in Spain itself and other settings which have been influenced by this 
paradigm, and the almost inevitable consequence of this is its wide ambit.152  
The inclusion of damage for emotional distress is not per se problematic and, 
although no precedent exists, it would seem reasonable to assert that feelings of trauma 
arising from a deliberate and malicious interference with the victim’s liberty of 
conscience and bodily integrity could in principle come within the auspices of art 1902. 
Nevertheless, the extent of its reach, and the level of compensation which would be 
awarded in this novel context are by no means clear, and it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that whilst the position of those following religiously determined diets is 
well protected, the safeguards on offer for other victims of ethical contamination are 
weaker in comparison. Ultimately, the more 
 
 
148 M Martín-Casals/J Ribot, Spain, in: B Winiger et al (eds), Digest of European Tort Law, vol 2: 
Essential Cases on Damage (2011) 1/10 no 1 ff.  
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conservative interpretation of bodily autonomy in Spain is one of the reasons for this 
and, combined with the failure of the Criminal Code to place non-religious matters of 
conscience on an equal footing with religious ones, vegans motivated by factors other 
than faith are comparatively exposed. 
 
 
IV Conclusion 
 
These gaps in the Spanish framework provide additional support for the idea that 
focusing on bodily autonomy in the English context has much to commend it. Of the 
two interests at play where ethical contamination is concerned, religious/ ideological 
freedom and bodily autonomy, the latter has the significant advantage of being 
universally applicable. By placing emphasis on the idea that all persons have a non-
negotiable right to determine what does or not does not enter their body, complicated 
debates about access to protection can be avoided. The features which we have 
identified in our Spanish analysis lead us to propose that trespass should be the natural 
and obvious route to follow in the English and Welsh paradigm. 
 
A disturbing incident from the United States demonstrates the advantages of this 
approach. A teenager baked her grandmother’s ashes into cookies, and fed the 
contaminated biscuits to fellow students, who had no clue that they were consuming 
human remains.153 Authorities were unsure of what criminal charges, if any, might 
apply and it is not yet clear whether any civil action might be brought.154 Nevertheless, 
this is a clear illustration of how people might feel distressed and violated at unwittingly 
consuming a substance which was physically harmless, even if they did not identify as 
vegan or with a specific religious tradition. 
 
Taken altogether, the combined weight of arts 8 and 9, alongside the independent 
Common Law rights discussed, suggest a very powerful impetus to push tort law in the 
direction of extending trespass to cover this kind of situation. It is the poster tort for 
protecting bodily self-determination.  
There is ample evidence from case law that an indirect application of force can 
amount to a battery in appropriate circumstances, and therefore, orchestrating a 
situation in which a person inadvertently touches and consumes a sub- 
 
 
 
153 California student baked grandma’s ashes into cookies, BBC News 17 October 2018 <https:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-45888446>.  
154 California student reportedly served cookies baked with grandma’s ashes to students, Fox News, 
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stance they would not wish to be in contact with, could be construed as trespass without 
contorting existing principles to snapping point.  
This outworking of a Common Law right through an established cause of action 
would also vindicate the key Convention rights which are engaged, and would also be 
in harmony with the respect which the legal framework shows for individual freedom 
of belief and conscience in the English and Welsh context. Whilst none of these forces 
would enable a court to break the chain of legal development and radically remodel 
trespass, they would be more than sufficient to push it further along its current 
trajectory. In our view, this would be a logical and desirable path to take in safeguarding 
individuals from molestation, in addition to upholding individual dignity and 
autonomy. 
 
 
Endnote: We are indebted to Santiago Cañamares, Simon Deakin, David Feldman, John Hart-shorne, 
Manuel Horta, Thomas Lewis, Jeff Murray, Javier Martínez Torrón, Dawn Oliver, María de la Paz 
Sánchez and Alison Young for their comments and feedback in the production of this article. Any 
infelicities, of course, are entirely are own. 
